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1  Master thesis written as part of the project ”Non –tariff barriers, food safety and 
international trade”  
Executive Summary 
In an effort trying to lower tariffs and induce more trade, The Uruguay 
Round (1995) allowed for the introduction of Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) 
as a transitional tool aiming towards lower tariffs in world trade (FAO 
2000). A TRQ allows for a certain amount of a good to be imported or 
exported with a reduced or zero tariff. When the TRQ is fully utilized, a 
higher tariff is put on all exceeding goods being exported or imported. 
Compared to a situation with tariffs, the TRQs saves the exporter or 
importer costs in terms of tariffs not paid to the holder of the TRQ 
licenses. But does this mean that TRQs are the same as free trade?  
This thesis examines the existence of costs related to the utilization 
of the TRQs in the specific case of Norwegian seafood export to the EU. 
As Norway`s most important seafood market, EU`s trade regulations 
are very important. Norway has zero tariff on the import of most 
whitefish products (Norges fiskerihøgskole 2006). Salmon has low 
tariffs (2%), but for pelagic fish and crustaceans/mollusks the tariffs 
are high. Mackerel (20% ) and herring (15%) are examples of products 
with high tariffs. The TRQs, make it possible to import a certain amount 
of seafood without paying tariffs. Norway can import seafood to the EU 
under 73 TRQs. Earlier papers has show that the existence of TRQs 
saved the Norwegian exporters 143 million NOK (Melchior 2007).  But 
are the TRQs representing free trade or are they rather a non - tariff 
barrier?  For example; are there costs related to the documentation of 
seafood origin? Or how large are the costs when having to rent storage 
in Denmark or Sweden to be able to secure a TRQ fraction before the 
TRQ is full?  
The case of Norwegian seafood export to the EU is examined 
through theory of the import quota, analysis of the utilization data for 
the TRQs and a business survey, asking Norwegian exporters directly 
what kind of costs they are experiencing utilizing the TRQs. Combining 
the business survey with quantitative utilization data for the TRQs 
allowed for a more comprehensive analysis of the effect of the TRQs on 
the Norwegian seafood exporter. Overall the transaction costs related to 
the TRQs are modest, but varying across the different seafood groups. 
As expected, the processed pelagic fish and crustaceans/mollusks are 
facing large barriers due to small TRQs and high out-of quota tariffs.  
Examining the utilization data in light of partial equilibrium import 
quota theory revealed that 42% of the TRQs are binding and that half of 
these bound TRQs are filled within 1/3 of the quota period. In a market 
where the majority of exporters are delivering the seafood DDP2 this 
means that the importer collects the quota rent and neither exporters 
nor consumers in the EU countries are benefitting from the TRQs. When 
comparing the utilization data from 2012/2013 with data from 
2005/2006, the percent of binding TRQs has gone down from 60% to 
42, but the speed at which the binding TRQs are filled is still the same. 
This indicates that the granting of TRQs has been able to follow the 
developments in the market to a certain extent, but some TRQs are still 
to small and represent a barrier to trade for the products concerned. 
The survey results revealed that the transaction costs were not of 
great concern. But it still introduced challenges. 61% of the firms in the 
survey reported on uncertainty and risk being a problem related to the 
utilization of the TRQs. Firms further reported on lack of ability to plan 
ahead due to small TRQs and uncertainty related to facing a full TRQ at 
the border. Two firms confirmed having lost market shares and chosen 
not to invest in the EU market due to the TRQ system. These costs 
related to uncertainty and risk clearly represents a barrier to trade, but 
could not be quantified by the exporters in my survey. A 
comprehensive examination of these costs in light of uncertainty theory 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but I encourage a trade-interested 
student to examine this further. 
                                                             
2   Seller is responsible  for all duties, tariffs and transportation before delivering to 
buyer.  
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 1. Introduction 
This thesis is written as part of the NUPI project “non-tariff barriers, 
food safety and international food trade”.  Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
and how they affect trade is a highly relevant issue, both in the light of 
the ongoing EEA – cohesion grants negotiations between Norway 
(together with the EEA countries) and the EU, but also as a growing 
phenomenon worth studying in itself.  
NTBs are all barriers, which inhibit trade in other ways than through 
tariffs. Under the broadest definition NTBs comprise all measures other 
than tariffs that restricts or otherwise distort trade flows 
(OECD).Examples of  NTBs are import quotas, special licenses, 
standards for the quality of goods etc. After the WTOs decision to 
reduce the use of tariffs, the use of NTBs has risen. Disguised as rules 
and regulations these barriers work in the same way as tariffs; reducing 
trade flows and harming the global trade.  
“Now that tariff barriers have been substantially reduced, there has 
been increasing interest in the ways which NTBs may distort and 
restrict international trade.”(Stern 1997) 
A particular form of trade barrier is the so-called tariff rate quota 
(TRQ), which imply that imports at reduced tariffs are allowed within a 
specified quantity. While TRQs aim to reduce trade costs by lowering 
tariff, they may create new costs related to their administration and 
use. For example, some TRQs are auctioned so instead of a tariff, the 
traders have to pay a quota price. This paper will examine the rent 
resource cost/seeking behavior related to the use of such quotas.  
1.1 Outline of paper 
This paper examines the TRQs for Norwegian seafood export to the EU 
in particular and examine whether these are a barrier to trade, in the 
form of costs for the Norwegian exporters. Earlier papers have explored 
the effect of new WTO regulations (Norges fiskerihøgskole 2006) and 
the expansion of the EU (Melchior 2002) on Norwegian seafood exports 
by examining the tariff equivalence and utilization of import quotas. In 
my thesis I will conduct a survey asking the exporters directly what 
their costs are related to the utilization of these import quotas. It is 
important to remember that the TRQs are saving Norwegian exporters 
millions of NOK in tariffs. In fact Melchior (2007) finds that Norwegian 
exporters saved 143 million NOK (6% of the export value) in tariffs in 
2005. A number that has probably increased with 50 million NOK 
following the increased number of TRQs. Compared to a situation with 
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tariffs the TRQs offer a better alternative. But the situation is not all 
black and white and this paper seeks to find out if there exist hidden 
costs utilizing this TRQ system. 
First, the paper will provide background information by briefly 
presenting the history and use of TRQs worldwide and 7 reasons for 
why import quotas can be harmful for trade. Furthermore Norway as a 
seafood exporter to the EU is presented, before examining the EU tariff 
and TRQ system and how seafood trade between Norway and the EU is 
regulated. The second part of the thesis will concentrate on economic 
theory of the import quota, administration and rent sharing. The third 
part is a quantitative study that will address how TRQ utilization data 
can give us an indication of whether a TRQ is a barrier or not. The 
fourth part of the thesis will focus on a qualitative survey preformed on 
Norwegian seafood exporters. The survey aims to reveal if there exist 
rent seeking /transaction costs related the use of the TRQs and if so, 
how large they are. Examples of transaction costs or rent seeking costs 
can be renting of storage in a EU country to ensure delivery within the 
TRQ or costs related to the documentation of origin when utilizing 
compensation TRQs. Other costs can be related to risk and uncertainty 
as these TRQs are given at a “first come first serve” basis and no one is 
guaranteed a quota. Finally, the conclusion part discusses the TRQs 
within the context of the theory, the utilization data and the survey.  
 
 2. Background 
2.1 The history and use of TRQs worldwide 
The Uruguay Round (1995) induced the creation of over 13000 new 
TRQs as the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) tried to 
lower tariffs and increase trade. In an effort trying to exchange complex 
tariff systems and quantity restrictions (QR) with an all tariff-based 
system WTO allowed for the introduction of Tariff-rate quotas in a 
period of transition (FAO, 2000). In some cases the new TRQs contri-
buted to a higher level of trade, but in others they have contributed to 
discrimination and put restrictions on trade (Skully 2001). TRQs are in 
many cases used by governments to keep competitive foreign firms out 
of their markets and protect their less competitive domestic firms. One 
example is the US sugar import quota. The US has TRQs for sugar and 
these are allocated by earlier trade flows (Skully 2001). The allocation 
of US sugar TRQs is historically based on sugar trade between 1975 
and 1980. This results in a situation where no new sugar producers are 
able to enter the US sugar market. This also means that the ones 
already exporting to the US cannot expand their exports to the US; the 
TRQs are the same every year (Skully 2001). In the theory chapter we 
will go into how an administration like this is discriminating and 
creates rent seeking behavior.  
Another country having a fair amount of TRQs is Norway. As the 
Uruguay round forced countries to reduce tariffs, Norway now protects 
its agricultural sector by enforcing TRQs. 55 of the 65 TRQs Norway has 
on agricultural products are allocated by auction.  When the TRQs are 
auctioned the sellers of the quota licenses, often the authorities in the 
importing country, collect the rents. (Skully 2001)We will get back to 
the quota rent under the theory chapter. A third way of allocating a 
TRQ is by first come first serve. This is the way the EU`s TRQs for 
seafood are allocated and we will examine how this allocation can lead 
to hidden costs for the Norwegian exporters.  
2.2 Why are import quotas harmful for trade? 
In the paper “Measurement of NTBs” Deardorff and Stern (1997) lists 
seven ways in which NTBs can harm international trade.  
1. Reduction in quantity exported– the most direct and obvious way an 
import quota can harm international trade 
2. Increase in price of goods exported- as an effect of a reduction in 
quantity. 
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3. A change in elasticity of demand – can be an effect of reducing 
quantity and increasing price. Often quotas can have the effect of 
reducing this elasticity so that the consumers will be less responsive 
to changes in prices at a later stage.  
4. The variability of an import quota. - As opposed to a tariff, the effect 
of a quota will vary over time as the import of the same amount 
every period, the effect will vary as it is independent from exchange 
rates, supply and demand etc. The fact that import quotas often are 
rigid is a problem as they cannot “follow” the market in the same 
way tariffs can. 
5. The uncertainty in implementation of import quotas can also be a 
barrier for exporters. Risk can arise when there is uncertainty related 
to who can take advantage of the quota in question. A quota,  
allocated on a first come first serve basis can create involve risk 
because there is uncertainty related to when the quota will be filled.  
6. Welfare cost. As the import quotas are distorting trade flows this 
causes welfare costs. By using the cost and quantity measures of the 
import quota one can identify the welfare cost by estimating the 
deadweight loss in a partial equilibrium.  
7. Resource cost. Welfare costs are also increased due to administration 
related to the import quota. These are direct administration costs in 
terms of actually enforcing the import quota and costs related to rent 
seeking behavior; resources used by exporters in order to obtain the 
quota rent.  
2.3 Norwegian seafood export 
Today the Norwegian seafood is known all over the world and Norway 
delivers fish to consumers in more than 130 countries. Numbers show 
that in 2012 Norway exported seafood at a value of 61 billion NOK, a 
17% increase since 2011. This large increase was caused by a rising 
demand for and production of Norwegian salmon3. Compared to the 
rest of the world this makes Norway the second largest exporter of fish. 
Being Norway`s third most important export article, after oil and gas, it 
is needless to say that trade policies for this sector are crucial to the 
Norwegian authorities and to the industry.  
 
 
 
                                                             
3 http://www.seafood.no/Nyheter-og-media/Nyhetsarkiv/Pressemeldinger/Kraftig-
økning-i-sjømateksporten 
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Figure 1: Seafood export in 2012 (Ministry of Trade and Fisheries, 20134) 
 
 
More than half (59%) of Norway’s seafood exports goes to the EU. 
Additionally, Norway is the most important supplier of seafood to the 
European market. By country, Russia is the most important importer 
with a value of 5,9 billion NOK in 2012 followed by France and Poland 
whit values at respectively 4,8 and 3,8 billion NOK. Markets in Asia are 
growing rapidly, but the EU continues to be the most important market 
for Norway (Ministry of Trade and Fisheries, 2013). It is therefore 
interesting to look at the TRQ system for Norwegian seafood export to 
the EU and how it is affecting Norwegian exporters. 
Figure 2: Norwegian seafood export (numbers provided by Norwegian Seafood 
Council) 
                                                             
4  Fact sheet on Norwegian seafood production and consumption published by The 
Ministry of Trade and Fisheries found at 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/nfd/dok/veiledninger_brosjyrer/2013/fakta-
om-fiskeri-og-havbruk-2013.html?id=733532 
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2.4 EU and seafood trade 
EUs Tariffs on seafood are bound in the WTO. The bound MFN - tariffs 
(Most Favored Nations) represents the maximum level of tariffs EU can 
put on seafood. Still there is room for setting lower or zero tariffs. As 
the largest seafood importer in the world the EU utilizes a range of 
different preferential tariffs, tariff quotas and zero tariff periods when 
importing seafood. This is both to make sure their citizens get the 
seafood they demand, while at the same time also protecting their own 
suppliers and producers.  The different tariff reductions on seafood 
import to the EU are: 
 Most favored Country tariffs (MFN) 
 WTO bound TRQs (e.g. cod, herring and clip fish) 
 WTO bound zero tariff periods (e.g. herring and mackerel)  
 Autonomous (for all third countries) tariff reductions (e.g. cod 
and shrimp) 
 Autonomous TRQs with reduced or zero tariff (e.g. herring) 
Additionally there are tariff reductions for some groups. The GSP, EBA, 
ACP and OCT5 countries pay zero tariffs on seafood exported to the EU. 
Additionally EU has Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with countries like 
Iceland and Chile giving them tariff reductions and TRQs for some 
seafood products. Norway has also been given tariff preferences and 
                                                             
5  GSP= EUs tariff preferences for developing countries, EBA=Everything But Arms, 
EUs tariff preferences for the least developed countries (zero tariff on seafood 
imports), ACP= EUs tariff preferences for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(zero tariff on seafood imports), OCT=Overseas Countries and Territories (zero tariff 
on seafood imports) 
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TRQs for different seafood products.(Norges fiskerihøgskole 2006). The 
regulation of seafood trade between the EU and Norway is quite 
complex and will be explained in the following. 
2.5 The regulation of seafood trade between Norway and 
the EU 
First of all the trade is regulated by the free trade agreement and “The 
letter of fisheries” from 1973. Through protocol 9 in the EEA agreement 
Norway has zero tariff on the import of most whitefish products (Norges 
fiskerihøgskole 2006). For salmon, EU MFN tariffs are also relatively 
low, foe example 2% for fresh or frozen whole salmon. For pelagic fish 
and crustaceans/mollusks, however, the EU has relatively high MFN 
tariffs and Norway has limited tariff reductions under the EEA 
agreement. For these products, TRQs play a particularly important role. 
Norway can export under 73 TRQs. Nine of these are GATT TRQs open 
for all WTO members, 25 are autonomous TRQs open for all countries 
and 39 are compensation TRQs open only for Norwegian seafood. 
These have been negotiated in relation to the expansion of the EU in 
1986, 1995, 2004, 2007 and 2009. The sizes of these quotas were 
based on the already existing trade flows between Norway and the 
respective EU country before they were included in the EU. The main 
goal of creating these TRQs was to allow the continuation of the already 
ongoing trade6. The first compensation TRQs were given to Norway in 
relation to the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Portugal was a 
member of EFTA at the time and Spain had a free trade agreement with 
EFTA. The negotiations granted Norway some tariff reductions and 
TRQs on important export products to Portugal and Spain; clip fish, 
stock fish and other products of cod. Though TRQs transferred some of 
the tariff the EU would have been able to collect without the TRQ to the 
Norwegian exporters, the tariff of about 13 % was still introduced as an 
out-of- quota tariff, making it hard for Norwegian exporters to export 
after the quota is filled. We will take a closer look at the utilization of 
these TRQs and how they affect trade later.  
The second group of TRQs came with the inclusion of Sweden, 
Austria and Finland in 1995(Sissener 2003) These TRQs included 
many types of fish, among them salmon, mackerel and herring. The 
TRQs introduced for Norwegian seafood in 1995 are for the most part 
the same every year and does not leave the exporters the opportunity to 
expand their engagement in the European market. A study done on the 
utilization of these TRQs in 2004 came to the conclusion that over half 
of the TRQs were fully utilized before the quota period was over, which 
indicates that the TRQ is binding and that the export from Norway is 
limited due to the TRQs (Sissener 2003). It was also found that some of 
the TRQs on produced goods were hardly used at all. This could mean 
                                                             
6  http://www.seafood.no/Markedsinformasjon/Markedsadgang/Tollkvoter-til-
EU/Om-tollkvoter 
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that the Norwegian produced products are not competitive in this area 
or that the demand for the particular good is not high enough.  
In 2004 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus and Malta were confirmed as EU 
members. The result of these negotiations was TRQs for both cod and 
herring. Bulgaria and Romania followed as EU members in 2007 giving 
Norway new and expanded TRQs for herring, mackerel, shrimp, capelin 
and catfish. The latest to join the EU was Croatia in 2013.  
The negotiations related to the inclusion of Croatia and compensa-
tion quotas started in January this year and are still ongoing. Six of the 
compensation TRQs expired in April 2014, meaning they will have to 
be renegotiated, giving the exporters yet another risk to put into their 
calculations. The last time these TRQs were negotiated it took 1,5 years 
before an agreement was reached and the TRQs were implemented. The 
compensation TRQ of 1400 tons processed herring given for the 
inclusion of Croatia will not be implemented until the negotiations are 
finalized. An alternative is to have it implemented on a temporary 
basis, but this all depends on the outcome of the negotiations. Accord-
ing to the seafood council the ongoing negotiations are mainly negoti-
ations about the 6 expiring TRQs, but in theory all compensation TRQs 
are open to adjustments. Of course the Norwegian fishing industry 
wants Norwegian authorities to push for lower tariffs and larger TRQs. 
The challenge related to the negotiations from 1994 and onward is that 
they are running alongside and linked to the EEA cohesion grant 
negotiations. As these “grants” can be seen as both aid to the less well-
off EU countries as well as a fee for getting access to the EU market, the 
linking can both be a pro and a con for a good result seen from the 
Norwegian exporters view. 
2.6 How to take advantage of the EU`s TRQs 
The compensation TRQs are reserved only for Norwegian Fish, so to be 
able to export under this TRQ you have to document that the fish is of 
Norwegian origin. Yet, another way to export seafood to the EU is 
through the autonomous TRQs introduced by the EU to ensure raw 
material for the production of seafood inside the EU. These 
autonomous TRQs are not origin conditioned and any country can take 
advantage of them. GATT TRQs, introduced due to WTO regulations, 
can be used by any WTO country. The Norwegian Seafood Council 
encourages the utilization of the GATT and autonomous TRQs before 
the use of the compensation TRQs to get as much Norwegian seafood 
into the EU as possible7. 
                                                             
7  http://www.seafood.no/Markedsinformasjon/Markedsadgang/Tollkvoter-til-
EU/Om-tollkvoter 
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All of these TRQs are given on a “first come first serve basis”. This 
implies that the first tons of fish being imported are imported at a zero 
or very low tariff and when the TRQ is full, an out -of -quota tariff has to 
be paid for the amount of fish exceeding the TRQ amount. When 
getting to the border a firm can import within these TRQs if the TRQ in 
question is not filled. Norwegian Seafood Council announces the status 
of each TRQ every day. But the license to import is not given to the 
exporters until the goods are physically at the border. This leads to a 
race for the exporters to get their share of the TRQ before the quota is 
full. This way of administrating the TRQ can lead to hidden costs for the 
exporters, for example by forcing them to move seasons or pay for 
storage in an EU country to be able to take advantage of the quota 
early.  
The compensations TRQs on Norwegian seafood are set based on a 
historical level and are not increased yearly or adjusted to the market. 
In cases when the quota actually is smaller than the import it indicates 
that either the market has decreased for that particular product or the 
Norwegian producers are no longer competitive. After the inclusion of 
many new east European countries into the EU, Norwegian exporters 
have gotten more competition from producers located within the EU8. 
These can be explanations of why some TRQs are not being fully 
utilized. Another important issue is that some exporters might be 
competitive within the quota, but if the quota fills up, they are not 
competitive within the out-of-quota- tariff and so they end up not 
taking the risk to invest in more production. For some of the TRQs; 
processed herring and mackerel, the out-of quota-tariffs are as high as 
15 and 20 per cent respectively. 
2.7 Conclusions from part 2: Background 
Norway has 73 TRQs for importing seafood to the EU and that many of 
these were established with the expansion of the EU to compensate for 
earlier free trade with different EU states. Some of these TRQs are large 
compared to the actual import from Norway, meaning they represent 
millions of NOK saved in tariffs for Norwegian exporters (Melchior, 
2007). Melchior (2007) estimated that the TRQs saved Norwegian 
exporters of about 143 million NOK in 2005. But TRQs are not the same 
as free trade. This paper examines the possible cost for the Norwegian 
exporter utilizing these TRQs. These costs can be related to many 
things; the TRQ being too small, cost related to documentation of 
origin, how the TRQs are administered etc. These questions will be 
addressed in the third and fourth part of the paper. Now, the theory of 
import quotas will be presented. 
 
                                                             
8  Anonymous interview 1. 
 3. The economic impact of TRQs  
3.1 Theory of the import quota 
An import quota is a regulation on how much can be imported of a 
specific product. The import quota is restrictive in the sense that it 
restricts the import amount in absolute terms; when the quota is filled, 
the import stops. This means that it is only effective if it is binding. It is 
binding if it allows a smaller amount than what is usually imported. If 
the quota is larger than the usual trade flow, not binding, then trade 
continues as normal and the import quota has no effect on trade. The 
TRQ also has a restriction on the amount imported, but it is not 
absolute as one can still import after the TRQ is full, but at a higher 
tariff level. If the out-of-quota tariff is very high, so high that it restricts 
imports completely after the quota is filled, then it has the same effect 
as an import quota. 
This chapter will illustrate the impact of import quota and later 
TRQs in a partial equilibrium framework, showing how it works in an 
economy with perfect competition and in a monopolist economy. 
Further the welfare costs and how the quota rent is allocated with 
different quota administrations is demonstrated before briefly introduc-
ing some new rent seeking theories. These theories will be helpful in 
understanding the utilization data and the survey results.  
3.2 Modeling effects of an import quota  
On the following pages, the effects of an import quota is modeled, 
presenting its tariff equivalent, as it has the same effect as a tariff under 
the condition of perfect competition.  
The purpose is to examine how an import quota affects trade and the 
welfare gain. Bhagwati (1965) argues that a quota, limiting the amount 
of goods being imported, will work in the same way as a tariff under the 
assumption of perfect competition. This implies that for each quota 
there exists a tariff equivalent.  
3.3 The tariff equivalence   
Figure 3 illustrates how an import quota under the assumption of 
perfect competition can have the same effect as a tariff. In this and in 
all models in this thesis world prices are assumed as given. A world 
price p* that lies below the equilibrium between domestic supply and 
demand is assumed. C0  and Y0 represents quantity consumed and 
quantity produced respectively. The amount of import into this market 
then becomes Co-Y0=M0. The same relationship is shown in figure 3b 
Linda Norum Ur 
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with M0 on the import demand curve M= D-S. The same starting point 
can be used to examine the introduction of a tariff.  
Figure 3: The effect of an import quota (Feenstra 2004) 
 
 
 
When the import quota Q is introduced, import is limited to m1. This 
restriction of import causes the price to shift up. When the price effect 
from the import quota Q in figure 3b is transferred to figure 3a, the new 
price p1 gives us the domestic supply Y1 and the demand C1. The effect 
of this quota is the same as if the government decided to introduce a 
tariff. With the introduction of a tariff equal to the difference between 
p1 and p* it results in exactly the same effect with respect to demand 
and supply. Consequently, for a world economy with perfect competi-
tion it is possible to argue that every import quota has a tariff 
equivalent. The theory makes clear that an import quota will reduce 
supply and increase prices and in that way be a barrier to trade. In part 
3, this theory will assist in examining the utilization of the TRQs for 
seafood export to the EU. If a TRQ is filled before the quota period is 
over and the export stops when it is filled, then the TRQ is binding and 
most likely prohibiting further trade that would have taken place if the 
TRQ had not existed.  
3.4 Administration of the quota and quota rent 
administration 
The above demonstrated how a TRQ in combination with a prohibitive 
tariff can work in the same way as a tariff. There is however differences 
in the way that firms adapt to quotas as opposed to tariffs. To be able to 
say something about the difference between the import quota and a 
tariff, it is necessary to look at the welfare change from having an 
import quota to that of having a tariff (Feenstra 2004).   
Tariff Rate Quotas – Free Trade or Non-Tariff Barriers?  17 
Figure 3 illustrates that the welfare change from introducing a quota 
is the consumer surplus loss: – (a+b+c+d), and the producer surplus 
gain +(a). So the total change in welfare is –(b+c+d). In the case with a 
tariff, the area c would be collected as profits for the government and 
end up with –(b+d) as the total change in welfare. But in the case with 
a quota, c can end up different places depending on how the quota is 
administered.  
First, consider administration of the import quota by auction of the 
licenses. If it is assumed that the auction is well organized and 
effective, the surplus c and the rent, will be collected by the auctioneer. 
Assuming the auctioneer is the government of the importing country, 
the welfare change will be: -(a+b+c+d) consumer surplus loss + (a) 
producer surplus gain + (c) auction revenue = -(b+d). The result is 
equal to the result with a tariff.  
Second, consider distribution of the import quotas can be given to 
the government of the exporting country This way of administrating the 
quotas are often called “voluntary” export restrictions (VER) as the 
government of the exporting country are the one handing out the 
import licenses to the exporting firms. When this plays out in terms of 
the domestic welfare change, c now is collected by the foreign firm so 
that the result becomes: - (a+b+c+d) consumer welfare loss + (a) 
domestic producer surplus = -(b+c+d). The total welfare loss 
domestically is larger than with the tariff. 
Third, consider a situation where the quota licenses are given to 
home producers. In this case, the home producers are able to import 
goods at price p* and then sell again at the domestic market at price p1. 
The home producers can collect the quota rent as profits, leading to the 
welfare change: -(a+b+c+d) consumer surplus loss + (a+c) producer 
surplus gain = -(b+d). The result where the quota licenses are given to 
the home producers provides the same welfare loss as when we 
introduced a tariff. This result however rests on the assumption that the 
home firms do not take on activities such as rent seeing, meaning they 
will act in an inefficient way to be able to obtain the licenses. Lobbying 
can be one example of such “rent seeking” activity. Some argue that 
rent seeing activities can be as costly as the rent itself. This implies that 
profit equals zero and the whole area c is lost. This would lead to a 
change in welfare equal to: - (a+b+c+d) consumer surplus loss + (a) 
producer surplus loss= -(a+b+c) which is larger than for the case with 
the tariff (Feenstra 2004). 
As we have seen through the partial equilibrium theory of import 
quotas; administration is very important. Deardorff and Stearn argue 
that the best way of administrating an import quota is by auction. 
Auction of import licenses in open competitive bidding and also 
allowing resale of these the price of the quotas will be equal to the 
anticipated difference between the price of the good in the domestic 
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market and the price of the good on the world market. In other words 
there will be no possibility of rent seeking behavior and the govern-
ment can collect the quota price as revenue (Stern 1997) 
The OECD report on non-tariff barriers from 1997 also states that 
auction is the better way of administrating import quotas: “The method 
of administration that most economists would prefer, but which 
governments only occasionally use, involves the auctioning of import 
licenses” (OECD, 1997). In this report the argument of competing the 
price of the quota down to the difference between domestic price and 
the world market price is repeated. 
The exact same result is found in Skully (2001) where it is also 
argued that the historically based allocation of licenses is the most 
discriminatory method of administration. Additionally Skully shows 
that the first come first serve basis, the EU TRQs are allocated by, can 
give us somewhat of a biased trade in the way that the goods will most 
likely be cheaper at start of the TRQ period. (Skully 2001) This 
argument being an alternative to the assumed argument in the partial 
equilibrium theory, that all trade happens instantaneously, so that 
there exists a quota rent to be collected.  
3.5 The import quota in an economy with imperfect 
competition 
Next, a market with imperfect competition is evaluated. Bhagwati 
(2005) has examined a monopolistic domestic market. With a tariff, the 
monopolist can choose to sell his product at the price p+1. If the 
monopolist increases the price more than that, the consumers will buy 
the imported good to the price p+1. However, with an import quota the 
monopolist will be protected by the quota, giving the monopolist the 
opportunity to set a higher price than p+1. To explain this in more 
detail figure 5 is useful. Here, C` represents the marginal cost for the 
monopolist, MR is marginal revenue for the monopolist and D 
represents the domestic demand. 
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Figure 5:  A market with a monopolist (Feenstra 2004) 
 
 
 
The figure above illustrates that a monopolistic market with a given 
world price, will give domestic production Y0. At this price the 
consumers want to buy C0. Subsequently C0-Y0 must be imported. In a 
“normal” situation where the monopolist would be able to control the 
market and produce at MR=C` there would only be produced Y2 amount 
of goods. In other words, the free market with a given world price 
reduces the power of the monopolist and the amount produced is the 
same as would have been produced by a competitive firm with the 
same MC as the monopolist. 
If the government decides to introduce a tariff t, the price would 
equal p*+t. At this price, the monopolist will be able to produce more; 
Y1, and the import would only be C1-Y1. The amount of goods however 
is reduced from C0 to C1. So the tariff protects the domestic monopolist 
but makes the consumer worse off by offering less goods. 
Instead of a tariff the government decides to introduce a quota. The 
quota should be equivalent to the tariff t so the quota is C1-Y1. Having a 
ceiling on import, the monopolist is free to control the market again.  
The function M now represents demand-quota and the monopolist has 
the opportunity to choose along this demand function. As a monopolist 
the natural choice will be to produce MR=C` . This leads to production 
Y2. At Y2 the price is P2. At price P2 the consumer will only demand C2 
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due to the high price. The result from introducing a quota is far from 
the same result as with the tariff. P2 is larger than P*+t and the total of 
goods produced is reduced from C1 to C2.  All in all we will have these 
results in a market with imperfect competition (monopolist market):  
1. A free trade market with a given free trade price will eliminate the 
power of the monopolist to set MR=C`. 
2. A tariff will force the monopolist to raise the price, but it will all inn 
all result in a higher quantum of goods than in a situation with a 
closed monopolist economy. 
3. A quota equivalent to the tariff will give the monopolist the 
opportunity to set MR=C` and produce Y2 at a high price; P2.  
The main point is that the domestic market is better off with a tariff 
than a quota under imperfect competition. The amount of goods 
produced will be raised and the price will increase. The reason for this 
is the “protected” market the quota creates for the monopolist. With the 
tariff, foreign firms can keep importing at P* + t so there is no room for 
the monopolist to raise the price by producing less goods, but with the 
quota that is possible. (Feenstra 2004) 
Both in a competitive and not competitive marked the administra-
tion of the quota effects the welfare gain and allocation of the quota 
rent. The TRQs for seafood import to the EU are administered on a first 
come first serve basis. In part 4, a survey will examine what kind of rent 
seeking behavior exists among exporters in this market.  
3.6 The Tariff Rate Quota and quota rent allocation 
So far the cases addressed have been with finite import quotas, mean-
ing that when the quota is filled, there is no possibility to import more. 
The tariff rate quota (TRQ) can be implemented in many different ways. 
Consider a TRQ where the tariff is zero on all goods imported within the 
quota, and then, when the quota is full, there will be a tariff t to pay on 
all goods exceeding the quota quantum. 
As shown in figure 6 a TRQ will have somewhat the same effect on 
the domestic market as a regular import quota.  Going back to the 
assumption of perfect competition the supply curve shifts up to the 
supply + tariff curve when the TRQ is filled, If the trade happens 
immediately, the result will most likely be that the price for the 
consumer is p + t. In the same way as with the regular import quota 
there will be quota rent to collect. Comparing figure 4b with figure 6 
the import quota results in a higher price p1 then what is the case for 
the TRQ: p+t. In terms of total welfare surplus a TRQ is better than an 
import quota.  
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Figure 6:  How a TRQ works (Melchior 2007) 
 
In the situation where the TRQ is lower than Qt and we get a price p+t 
we also get an amount saved t*(Qt-TRQ), which is the quantum sold 
without a tariff. If the sale of the particular good is sold gradually so 
that the quota can gradually fill up and the importer can sell the first 
quantum to consumers for a price without the tariff, then this saved 
amount may potentially benefit the consumers. But if all the goods are 
sold instantaneously, this difference between p and p+t, “the quota 
rent”, can be collected by importers or exporters just like in the case 
with the import quota (Melchior 2007).  
In part 3 of this thesis the speed at which the TRQs are filled will be 
examined. The theory on speed will be helpful in determining what 
actors can collect the quota. 
So far the theory suggests that whoever attains a TRQ license also 
collects the rent. But other factors such as imperfect competition and 
who has the right to import can also determine the allocation of the 
quota rents in the end (Boughner et.al, 2000.) For the case where 
licenses are given to importing or exporting firms one runs the risk of  
giving the license to high cost or inefficient firms. If we on the other 
hand have a situation where licenses are not given to firms, then the 
rent seeking behavior and bargaining power determine the allocation 
of the rent. For example in a case where exporting licenses are 
allocated and we assume importing firms are fully competitive. The 
exporting firms will have bargaining power and get all the rents. In this 
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case a welfare gain will still be attainable if the exporting firms are low 
cost firms. But if the licenses are given to high cost firms the rent will be 
lost. Allowing resale of the licenses can solve this inefficiency. 
(Boughner et.al, 2000.) In a situation where both exporters and 
importers are given licenses, the rent most likely will not be shared 
equally unless the bargaining powers are also equal. In Hornig, 
Boisvert and Blandford (1990) it is show that exporters were able to 
extract more of the rent than the importers in the US import market for 
cheese. 
The theory of bargaining power and market structure in rent sharing 
will be helpful in determining what actors can collect the quota rent 
when examining the utilization data and the business survey results in 
part 3 and 4. 
3.7 Conclusions from part 3: Theory 
The following can be extracted from the theory chapter: 
 A TRQ only effects trade if it is binding 
 The TRQ is binding if the TRQ is filled 
 A TRQ works in the same way as an import quota if the TRQ is 
binding and the out-of quota tariff is too high 
 The administration of the TRQ is important. Auction is the best 
way to administer a TRQ and resale of licenses limits the 
deadweight loss. 
 The speed at which the TRQs are being filled, the market 
structure and the bargaining power of the importers and 
exporters decides who can collect the quota rent. 
 
 
 4. A quantitative analysis of   
utili- zation data 
Mapping of coffee value chains in Coorg 
This part analyzes the utilization data of the TRQ for seafood import to 
the EU. First, illustrations of the different utilization scenarios are 
presented. 
 
Figure a 
 
Figure b 
 
Figure a illustrates a TRQ that does not have any effect on the trade 
flow because the demand for imported goods are lower than the TRQ 
amount. Figure b illustrates the situation where the TRQ is binding as 
the imported amount is exactly the same as the TRQ amount. 
 
Figure c 
 
Figure d 
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Figure c illustrates a TRQ that is binding, but not prohibitive. The TRQ 
for Norwegian salmon works like this as the out-of-quota tariff is only 
2% and there is still export going on after the TRQ is filled. Figure d 
illustrates a TRQ with a very high out-of quota tariff, making it hard to 
be competitive after the TRQ is filled.   
To say with certainty that the TRQ is binding and prohibitive we 
need data for total export within each TRQ. Using data for the total 
export within each TRQ group comparing it with the size of the TRQs it 
would have been possible to examine if the export stopped when the 
TRQ was filled. Unfortunately this data was not possible to retrieve. I 
will therefore have to make the assumption that a full TRQ is a binding, 
but maybe not prohibiting TRQ. If the out-of-quota tariff is high I will 
assume it is prohibitive, but if it is low I will assume it is not. 
This chapter will examine the utilization data for compensation 
TRQs, GATT TRQs and autonomous TRQs for seafood import to the EU. 
Further it examines the speed at which the TRQs are being filled. If the 
TRQs are filled fast, and most of the year/TRQ period goes by with 
exporters paying the out-of-quota tariff, then the importer or exporter 
will be the ones to collect the quota rent, as the price will most likely be 
high all year. If, on the other hand, vacant TRQs are available most of 
the year, it is likely that the price impact is smaller The speed analysis 
will also be compared with the utilization speed for the TRQs in 
2005/2006 examined in Melchior (2007). Analyzing the development 
in TRQ fill rate might give an indication of how well the TRQ system has 
kept up with the market and if there exist a cost related to the lack of 
variability in TRQs. Lastly this chapter will use the utilization data to 
examine if there is a relationship between the tariff preference of 
exporting within a TRQ and the utilization of this TRQ. If there is a 
positive relationship this indicates that there exists large transaction 
costs utilizing the TRQ. 
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4.1 Utilization of the 3 different TRQ groups  
 
Figure 8: Utilization of compensation TRQs for Norwegian seafood 2012/ 2013 
(based on data supplied by the Norwegian Seafood Council) 
 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the utilization of the compensation TRQs for seafood 
originated from Norway for 2012/ 2013. Twenty of the forty-eight TRQs 
were filled 100%. This amount to a total of 42% binding TRQs, 
meaning that 42% of the TRQs are a barrier to trade in the sense that 
only a portion of the trade is done without a tariff. 42% of the TRQs are 
working in the way that is shown in figure b or c. If the out-of- quota 
tariff is high we are in figure b, meaning that the TRQ is both binding 
and prohibitive. The TRQ for fresh Mackerel, with an out-of-quota tariff 
of 20%, is an example of this kind of TRQ. If the out-of-quota tariff is 
low we are in figure c, meaning that the TRQ is just binding, but not 
prohibitive. The TRQ for salmon, with an out-of-quota tariff of 2%, is an 
example of this kind of TRQ.  The rest of the TRQs are then not binding 
as the total amount exported was smaller than the TRQ amount. These 
can still be barriers to trade in terms of all the other measures we have 
addressed in this thesis, for example if out-of-quota tariff is very high 
and the fear of not making the TRQ before it is filled is too big, then we 
are dealing with a barrier. As soon as a TRQ makes exporters act 
different than in a situation with free trade we can potentially be 
looking at a barrier to trade. The higher the utilization percent, the 
more likely we are dealing with a TRQ that can be a barrier to trade; 
depending on the TRQ period, size and out-of-quota tariff. 
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Figure 9: Utilization of GATT TRQs 2012/2013 (data supplied by the Norwegian 
Seafood Council) 
 
 
 
Figure 9 shows the utilization of the GATT TRQs, TRQs open for all 
WTO countries. As have been the case for many years, 70 % of these 
were fully utilized (seafood council).This also includes the TRQ for 
processed cod, being used by many Norwegian exporters.  Since these 
TRQs can be used by any WTO country, raw fish from foreign countries, 
like Russia, can be bought, processed in Norway and exported within 
these TRQs. The Norwegian Seafood Council recommends using the 
GATT and autonomous TRQs ahead of using the compensation TRQ 
when it is possible. With this in mind 70% of the GATT TRQs being 
fully utilized might not be that surprising Still, the TRQ for herring has 
not been filled the last 4 years, having been full every year dating all 
the way back to 20049. 
                                                             
9  Data supplied by the Norwegian Seafood Council. 
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Figure 10: Utilization of autonomous TRQs 2012/2013 (data supplied by the 
Norwegian Seafood Council) 
 
 
 
The figure above shows the utilization of the autonomous TRQs, TRQs 
open to all countries. These TRQs are purely for raw material for the 
EU`s processing industry. Here only 5 out of 25 TRQs were filled in 
2012/2013, but 3 of these are cod and shrimp TRQs, important to 
Norwegian exporters. Some of these TRQs are not even relevant for 
Norway, exemplified as pacific salmon and octopus. We do not have 
exact numbers on how much of Norwegian raw material was exported 
within these TRQs, but one might speculate why the number has 
increased as the TRQs for processed food are very small and the raw 
material autonomous TRQs are of a larger magnitude. Whether or not 
Norwegian businesses have moved from processed to raw delivery of 
seafood, the Norwegian processing industry has been robbed of some 
revenue due to the EU TRQ system (Melchior, 2007). 
A similar exercise of looking at utilization data for TRQs was done by 
Melchior (2007) with trade data from 2005/2006. Comparing todays 
data with the data from 2005/2006 can give an indication of how well 
the TRQ system has adapted to development in the seafood imports to 
the EU. The data used was utilization of compensation TRQs and 3 
TRQs important for Norwegian exporters; the GATT TRQ for herring and 
two autonomous TRQs for cod.  
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Figure 11: From Melchior (2007): utilization data for compensation TRQs and 3 
other TRQs in the period 2005/2006.  
 
 
 
The result in Melchior (2007) is presented in figure 11 (paper written in 
Norwegian). The text box states the result; 28 out of 46 TRQs were 
filled 100%. In other words, 60% of the TRQs were binding. 
To be able to do a comparison with the 2005/2006 numbers a new 
utilization figure will show the utilization data of compensation TRQs 
for 2013, plus the 3 TRQs mentioned above. As some compensation 
TRQs have been expanded and some new ones have been added as the 
EU grew, it will not be a perfect comparison of the two situations, but 
we will be able to see if the situation has improved or worsened since 
2005/2006. 
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Figure 12: Utilization data for compensation TRQs and 3 more TRQs for the 
period 2012/2013 (based on data supplied by the Norwegian Seafood 
Council) 
 
 
 
The above figure shows the utilization data for compensation TRQs and 
the 3 TRQs included in Melchior’s (2007) original study. This figure is 
made for the purpose of comparing the two. We here see that 21 out of 
50 TRQs have been fully utilized. This amounts to a binding share of 
42%. As we are here dealing with quite small numbers, a decrease from 
60% to 42% is not that big, but it is a clear improvement from the 
2005/2006 numbers. This shows that the compensation TRQs have 
been able to keep up with the development within the seafood export 
market and that the system is not as prohibitive as it was in 
2006/2007. This is positive, but one cannot exclude the possibility that 
the TRQ system has actually made exporters flee the EU market and 
found new markets. Another explanation can be, as some exporters 
have reported, that exporters have established new or underlying 
businesses in the EU to avoid the whole TRQ system. One could do 
more research on this issue by looking into trade flows from Norway to 
the EU over the last decade. It could for example be interesting to 
examine the possible change in trade flows before and after the 
entrance of a country into the EU. But this is outside the scope of this 
thesis and will not be addressed here.  
4.2 Speed and quota rent 
Many of EU`s TRQs for seafood are binding. With a binding TRQ there is 
a quota rent to be collected. Examining the speed at which the TRQ is 
filled can give an indication on what actors will be able to collect this 
rent. If it is filled fast and tariff is paid most of the year, the importers or 
exporters most likely will be able to collect the rent (Melchior 2007).  
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We examine the 22 compensation TRQs, the 6 GATT TRQs and the 6 
autonomous TRQs that were fully utilized in 2013 and set up a figure 
showing how fast they were filled. Figure 13 shows how much of the 
TRQ period that were gone before the TRQ was filled. If the TRQ lasts 
for a year and was filled after 6 months the number will be 6/12= 0,5. If 
the TRQ period was 6 months and the TRQ was filled after 2 months, 
the number is 2/6= 0.33.   
Figure 13: speed at which all the TRQs (compensation, GATT and autonomous) 
are filled for 2013 (based on data supplied by the Norwegian Seafood Council) 
 
 
 
From figure 13 we see that half of the TRQs were filled before 1/3 of the 
period had gone by. This means that we have a situation where trade 
goes on most of the year with a tariff. When the period without a tariff 
is so small, the market price will most likely be a price including the 
tariff, and the consumers will not benefit from the TRQ. The quota rent 
will most likely go to the exporter or importer for the TRQs being filled 
quickly. For the TRQs being filled further out in the period and at the 
end of the period the situation might be better for the consumers in the 
sense that it is easier to hold the price low and the benefit from the 
TRQ, the quota rent, will be collected by the consumers in terms of a 
lower price. The quota rent will most likely be collected by different 
actors depending on how fast the TRQ is filled. Of course, the 
possibility of collecting the quota rent for the importers and exporters 
also depend on the elasticity of demand from the consumer side. If the 
price elasticity for one particular seafood group is high, it will not be 
that easy for the importers and exporters to collect the quota rent by 
keeping the price high (Norges fiskerihøgskole, 2006) 
From the theory of rent sharing the rent allocation also depends on 
the market structure and the bargaining power of the importers and 
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exporters. In the case with the EUs TRQs the exporters are the actors 
with less bargaining power as the importers can choose the exporters 
offering the lowest price. The exporters who are able to export within 
the TRQ will offer a lower price compared to those who have to pay the 
out-of-quota tariff. Due to the “first come first serve” administration the 
quota rent most likely goes to the importers. The fact that most export-
ers also deliver their goods DDP, meaning the exporter is responsible 
for all duties, tariffs and transport until it reaches the importer, also 
supports this. This result is based on an assumption that there is 
perfect competition in both the export and the import market. 
Comparing with Melchior (2007) we look at the same speed graph 
for 2005/2006 data. The result was very similar to the one for 
2012/2013. The text box in the figure saying that half of the TRQs are 
being filled before 1/3 of the period has gone by. The figure from 
Melchior still having compensation TRQs plus 3 others and the 2012/ 
2013 having all TRQ, compensation, GATT and autonomous it is not a 
good sign that the most resent data are no better than the 2005/2006 
data. This might indicate that even though there seams to be better 
situation today in terms of how many TRQs being binding, the pressure 
on those that are binding is still the same. 
Figure 14: From Melchior (2007): speed at which the TRQs were filled for 
2005/2006 
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4.3 Are transaction costs related to tariff preference? 
In figure 8 shown earlier we saw that twenty of the forty-eight compen-
sation TRQs. This indicates that these TRQs are trade barriers within 
these groups of seafood. However the out-of-quota tariff is also relevant 
in the question about whether or not the TRQ is a barrier to trade. For 
example the data tells us that there is no difference between a TRQ with 
a high and a low out-of-quota tariff. Both the TRQs for herring with a 
15% out- of –quota tariff and the TRQ for salmon with a 2% out-of-
quota tariff are both filled within the first month of their periods.  
This is an important observation as one might be tempted to believe 
that the utilization of a TRQ is related to the magnitude of the tariff 
preference. One could for example put out the hypothesis that a TRQ 
with less than a 2% tariff preference would not be used. Indicating that 
the transaction costs by using such a TRQ would be around 2% 
(Melchior 2007). Melchior (2007) plotted the tariff preferences against 
the utilization data for TRQs of 2005/2006 and found no such 
relationship. Plotting the data for 2013 we get this result: 
Figure 15: Utilization of the TRQs on the horizontal axis and the tariff 
preference of exporting within the TRQ on the vertical axis give us the 
relationship between the two for 2013 (based on data supplied by the 
Norwegian Seafood Council). 
 
 
 
From this scatter plot we can see that there is no clear pattern. Both 
TRQs with a large tariff preference, having a high out- of – quota tariff, 
and the TRQs having a low tariff preference, a low-out-of-quota tariff 
are both being filled 100% or hardly filled at all. This tells us that there 
might not be too high transaction costs related to the use of these TRQs.  
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4.4 Small, unfilled TRQs 
Going through all of these TRQs a curiosity appears with the very small 
TRQs for very specific types of seafood that are hardly being utilized at 
all. Take for example the compensation TRQ for processed salmon. The 
TRQ being 300 and by the end of the period the utilization is only 2%. 
This can have many explanations. One is that the TRQ is so small that 
the exporters do not bother using it, though we have seen that there is 
not a positive relationship between the tariff preference and the 
utilization data, meaning that there should be no reason not to use the 
TRQs. For the TRQ for processed salmon the out –of-quota tariff is 
much higher than the tariff for unprocessed salmon. For this reason 
exporters may choose to go for the less risky TRQ. In other words, 
exporters might be competitive within the TRQ, but not with the out-of-
quota tariff put on top. This might be the case for many of these small 
TRQs. The fact that they are small also gives them a higher risk of 
getting filled up fast, so the risk might be too big of not making the 
border before the TRQ is filled. This is also related to the administration 
of these TRQs. The “first come first serve” way of administrating the 
TRQs makes it risky to go for small TRQs such as the one for processed 
salmon. If you put a high out-of-quota tariff on top of a small TRQ 
exporters may find it too risky to utilize that TRQ.  
Another explanation, also confirmed by some companies, is that the 
Norwegian processing industry within some seafood groups are just not 
competitive enough. The growing competition from processors within 
the EU makes it hard for Norwegian processors to keep up. We will take 
a closer look at the feedback from seafood exporters in the following 
chapter. 
4.5 Conclusions from part 4: A quantitative analysis of 
utilization data 
By using utilization data from 2012/2013 we have found that: 42% of 
the compensation TRQs, 70% of the GATT TRQs and 20% of the 
autonomous TRQs in 2012/2013 were binding. Compared to data from 
2006/2007 the number of binding TRQs has gone down, but the TRQs 
are still being filled at the same speed. This indicates that the TRQ 
system has managed to keep up with the development in the seafood 
import market, but some seafood groups continues to be problematic. 
The TRQs for fresh mackerel and herring are examples of such TRQs. 
They both fill up fast and have high out-of-quota tariffs: Fresh mackerel 
(20%) and fresh herring (15%).  
Examining the speed at which all the TRQs (compensation, GATT 
and autonomous) were filled we found that 50% were filled before 1/3 
of the TRQ period had gone by. This is telling us that the importers 
and/or exporters trading within these TRQs can collect the quota rent 
because the price is most likely to be held high the whole period. 
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When comparing the tariff preference within a TRQ and the rate of 
utilization we found that there was no clear relationship. This indicates 
that transaction costs are not very high for these TRQs. The next 
chapter will examine this more extensively with a business survey. 
Analyzing the utilization data it became clear that there exists some 
very small TRQs that are hardly used at all. This indicates either a risk 
problem with both a small TRQ and a “first come first serve” 
administration, or a lack of competitiveness from the Norwegian 
exporter side. This issue will also be addressed in the business survey.  
 
 5. Business Survey 
To examine how the TRQs affect Norwegian seafood exporters, a busi-
ness survey was created to collect data directly from the exporters. Data 
collected directly from the exporters give a more nuanced under-
standing of the situation as one can get more detailed answers to the 
underlying issues related to the TRQs. The purpose was to find out if 
there exist rent seeking costs or transaction costs related to the 
utilization of the TRQs and if so, how large these are. 
As mentioned in the introduction the TRQs are saving the Nor-
wegian exporters millions in tariffs every year, but are there hidden 
costs related to these TRQs that are not being accounted for when 
negotiating about the size etc. By using a business survey asking the 
exporters what kind of transaction costs they encounter and how large 
they are we can get a better understanding of how these TRQs effect 
trade flows between Norway and the EU. Example of a transaction cost 
can be the costs related to the documentation of origin when utilizing 
the compensation TRQs earmarked for fish with Norwegian origin. (the 
fish is labeled according to the nationality of the boat that caught it.) In 
the survey a question examining this issue would as if the exporter has 
experienced costs related to the documentation process and if so, how 
large these cots are. Another example of cost is the investment or 
renting costs to get access to storage in an EU country to ensure a 
fraction of the TRQ before it is filled. The Norwegian Seafood Council 
reports that as much as 3500 tons of clip fish went through Denmark in 
2013 and was most likely stored there to secure a part of the GATT TRQ 
before going to Portugal where it is consumed.  
The business survey will also asked what TRQs are experienced as 
too small (binding) and how that affects the exporters. Related to the 
administration of the TRQs the survey will examine if there is risk and 
uncertainty related to the use of “first come first serve” TRQs and if the 
exporters would rather prefer another type of administration. From the 
utilization and theory chapter one might expect that the exporters 
would want an auction instead of a “first come first serve system”, but 
this also comes with risk attached to it as one can never be certain how 
much one has to pay for a TRQ so this is not certain. One must also 
remember that the auction system is the best system from the 
perspective of the welfare gain of the whole society, but not from the 
perspective of the private exporter. Recapturing the result on the no 
existing relationship between the tariff preference by utilizing a TRQ 
and the utilization rate one will also expect that the transaction costs 
might not be large in total. But as the utilization data highlighted, there 
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are large differences between the TRQs and the business survey will 
also reflect that. 
The challenge when conducting a business survey is however the 
possible analytical issues arising with the use of human experience as 
the main source of data. There might be an existence of bias, faulty 
memory or personal agendas. For example; as the thesis is part of a 
publicly funded project, the exporters might have the incentive to 
report larger costs than observed, to convince the Norwegian authori-
ties that this is a more serious problem than it really is. Another issue is 
non-response and low response rates, as few responses provide less 
robust results than optimal. Another issue related to non-responsive-
ness is the possible bias of respondents being systematically different 
from the non-respondents. For example, all respondents being small 
companies and all non-respondents being large companies, the survey 
would be biased trying to represent all Norwegian seafood exporters 
exporting to the EU. Even though there are some possible analytical 
issues related to a business survey this is still the best way to get data 
that can supplement the utilization data analysis and give a better 
understanding of how these TRQs work. 
5.1 Creating the survey 
The Norwegian Seafood Council was contacted at an early stage to get 
an impression of what kinds of problems and potential costs that 
existed in this market. To be able to put together a survey with the most 
important barriers and possible costs related to them, pilot interviews 
were conducted with 3 exporters, Norges Fiskarlag, The Norwegian 
Seafood Federation and the Norwegian Seafood Council. Additionally, 
my supervisor Arne Melchior contributed with valuable input as an 
experienced researcher within the field. Constructing the survey and 
the questions it became clear that there existed a gap between what 
kind of information that would be most favorable for the thesis and 
what would be possible to obtain from the exporters. The most interest-
ing information for the thesis would be to get information on a EU Tariq 
number level on exactly how many tons had been exported within and 
outside of a TRQ the last quota period. From other researcher`s 
experience I learned that this kind of data would be very hard to get 
obtain as it would be time consuming for the exporters, and they might 
not even have those exact numbers registered. As I realized this, but 
still saw it as very valuable information if some exporters would be 
willing to report on this; I chose to add the question as a voluntary part 
at the end of the survey. Concluding the survey, only one exporter had 
answered the question, confirming my beliefs about this being too 
detailed information to be asking for. 
The survey was made up of yes and no questions with one or two 
sub questions. The reason behind the simplicity of answers to a 
question were based on an assumption that the people getting these 
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surveys are very busy people who does not have the time to answer a 
long and demanding survey. 
Rambøll`s online survey tool “survey xact” was used to assemble 
the answers from the survey. This was a very user friendly survey tool, 
allowing the construction of a number of questions, distributing these 
to a larger number of businesses through the program`s email function 
and lastly presenting aggregated results for the whole survey in real 
time. This online questionnaire sent by email, was the best option as 
the goal was a quantitative survey. Getting as many answers as 
possible was also the goal when creating a very simple question 
scheme. One example question:  
Does the documentation of origin related to the use of the 
compensation TRQs represent a cost for your company? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how large is the cost (in per cent of the sales price) 
In the sub questions the program collected some answers on the cost 
of different issues related to the TRQs, but most exporters answered 
that it was impossible to calculate the cost. 
5.2 Administrating the survey 
All together the survey consisted of 27 questions, including the 
informational questions covering size of company etc. Through the 
Norwegian Seafood Councils database on seafood exporters 199 
companies exporting to the EU market was extracted.  
The survey was sent out to these 199 exporting companies 11th of 
December. A reminder was sent out both 18th of December and 7th of 
January. Out of the 199 companies contacted 16 replied that they were 
not eligible for the survey, either by no longer being exporters to the 
EU, having shut down their business or for other reasons. The survey 
was concluded 24 January 2014. After conclusion of the survey, 19 
companies had answered all or some questions in the survey. This also 
included the pilot interviews. The choice of completing an online 
survey could have been replaced with all phone based interview, but 
even though the response rate was not sufficient enough to get a 
quantitative study, the results points in a certain direction and can be 
valuable for further research within the field of TRQs.  
As the survey was sent out to exporters only based on their regi-
stration as a EU exporter, it reached out randomly to both small and 
large businesses. As the survey also consisted of questions related to 
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the size and share value of the company the bias of only getting reports 
from one group of exporters was avoided. The number of employees 
within the companies ranged from 2 to 200 and the turnover ranged 
from 1 million to 1 billion NOK.  
The questionnaire in Norwegian can be found in the Appendix. The 
answers are exempt from the paper due to firm sensitive data. The most 
important questions and results will be reviewed in the following. 
Has your business utilized the TRQs when exporting seafood to the 
EU the last 3 years?  
Yes 
No 
16 out of 19 answered yes. As all of these firms have reported of 
exporting goods to the EU this could mean that these firms find the 
costs related to utilizing the TRQs so high that they choose not to use 
them, the tariff on the good the firm is exporting is of no relevant size or 
the TRQ has been full at the time the firm imported their goods to the 
EU. Most likely these firms are exporting salmon, a product that has 
only a 2% tariff level. The survey continues with answers from 17-18 
firms, indicating that at least two of the firms have not answered all 
questions, most likely because the question was not relevant. If we 
assume these firms are not utilizing the TRQs because the tariff on their 
exported goods are so low, the percentage of firms reporting of costs 
would have gone down if they had answered the whole survey. This 
means that the survey might overestimate the importance of costs. But 
if we assume the firms are not utilizing the TRQs because the cost of 
doing so is too high, then the survey is underestimating the importance 
of costs. Either way the number of firms answering the survey is too 
small to give quantitative result, but can give us a hint about the costs 
related to these TRQs. 
Has your business adapted and made changes, by for example 
renting storage close to the border, changed seasons or taken 
advantage of middleman in the hope of attaining a part of a TRQ?  
Yes 
No 
If yes, how much do these adjustments amount to in NOK? 
2 out of 19 companies, 11% answered yes. One company reported of 
renting storage in a EU country before the TRQ was full while the other 
reported use of storage for freezing and establishment of daughter 
companies in both Denmark and Sweden.  
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The main result attained from this business survey is that the costs 
related to the TRQs are existing, but on the whole modest. For some 
seafood groups the costs are substantial and the result might have been 
different with a narrower group of business. If for example the business 
survey was distributed to companies only exporting within the pelagic 
seafood groups the result might have shown higher costs.  
5.3 Survey questions and results 
Is your business experiencing costs relating to the documentation 
needed to use the compensation TRQs for Norwegian fish? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how much do these costs amount to? 
4 out of 18 companies, 22%, answered yes. Of the companies 
reporting costs there were huge differences in the size of these costs. 
Some reported that the costs would amount to the same, independent 
of the amount of seafood exported, while other`s reported on costs 
ranging from 2 to 15% of the sales price.   
Have the TRQs led to uncertainty and made risk analysis harder for 
your firm? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, in what way? 
11 firms, 61% of the companies that answered the survey answered 
yes on this question. This amounts to one of the highest affirmative 
scores in the survey. Many of the comments saying that the planning of 
a year is very difficult as you never know when the TRQ will be filled. 
Especially for the exporters of mackerel with an out-of-quota tariff of 
20% it becomes very difficult to plan the season. Also for the exporters 
of processed seafood it is reported that it is difficult to plan for the 
purchasing of raw material. Some of these TRQ are so small that it is 
even reported that the TRQ is filled up while a load of seafood is on its 
way to the border.  
Is it a problem that the TRQs are too small and are filled too fast? 
Yes 
No 
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If yes, for what TRQ is this a problem? 
61% of the firms answered yes on this question and the reported 
TRQs were: 
Shrimp, Processed herring, crab, processed cod, stock fish, clip fish 
and mackerel. This confirmed the suspicion from last chapter that these 
are the binding TRQs representing a barrier for these specific seafood 
groups.  
Has your business lost market shares due to the inclusion of new 
countries in the EU and the shift from free trade to the TRQ system? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how much approximately has your business lost due to this? 
2 of 16 companies, 13% answered yes. They were not able to give a 
cost estimate, but as expected it was reported that the Polish market is 
a market where this has been a problem for Norwegian exporters. The 
follow up question to this was. 
Has your business made the decision of not entering markets in the 
EU due to the TRQ system? 
Yes 
No 
The answers here were the same as in the previous question. 
Although 13% is not a huge number, especially when we know we are 
only talking about two companies in this survey, it is still worrying that 
some companies report of this being the situation. This is certainly 
pointing in the direction that these TRQs are a barrier to trade. 
Although the costs cannot be pinpointed as great and vary a lot across 
the different seafood groups one still has to acknowledge it is a pro-
blem that the reporting of companies choosing not to invest in markets 
exists at all. Of course this can be a result of Norwegian firms not being 
competitive, and reporting that the TRQs is the reason, but most likely 
the TRQs and making the EU market bigger has contributed to Norway 
having a disadvantage when it comes to competitiveness.  
Is your company exporting also after the TRQ is filled? 
Yes 
No 
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If yes, what seafood products do you export after the TRQ is filled 
and how much? 
13 answered yes and 5 companies no on this question. Resulting in 
28% reporting of not exporting after the TRQ is filled. This indicates the 
same as we saw in the utilization data, some TRQs have an out-of-quota 
tariff so high that it stops Norwegian exporters from trading after the 
TRQ is filled. In other words, some of the TRQs work in the same way as 
binding import quotas.  This question also relates to the rent sharing 
theory. Exporting when the quota is filled also depends on whether the 
exporter or importer pays the out-of-quota tariff.  The utilization chap-
ter indicated that the Norwegian exporters carry this cost. The pilot 
interviews confirmed that this was the case for most exporters. Even 
though the TRQs are importing quotas given to importers, the exporters 
are the ones actually handling the TRQs at the border, paying the out-
of-quota tariffs and signing papers. One exporter reported on having an 
arrangement with an importer paying the out-of-quota tariff when the 
TRQ was full, but most exporters reported on lost agreements when the 
out-of-quota tariff was initiated.  
To get a better impression of how the exporters` perception of the 
TRQ system and the administration of it I also asked some questions 
relating to the “first come first serve” concept and the tariff vs TRQ 
issue. 
The TRQs for Norwegian seafood to the EU are today allocated 
through a “first come, first serve” concept. Would it be desirable for 
your company to exchange this way of administrating the TRQ? (For 
example a system were the TRQs are auctioned) 
Yes 
No 
If yes, what kind of system would your company prefer? 
94% of the companies answered no to this question. 16 out of 17 
companies did not want another system of administration for the TRQs. 
This is not a very surprising answer as the possible quota rent will 
disappear due to free competition or go to the EU authorities. The 
auctioning is the best option according to our theory in terms of the 
minimal welfare loss, but as an exporter you are a profit maximizer and 
auction might remove the quota rent you gain as an exporter within the 
TRQ in today`s system. On the other had an auction system could 
possibly remove some of the uncertainty and risk related to the fear of 
not making a TRQ in time. As this survey reports of high risk and 
uncertainty it is a puzzle why the exporters do not want another less 
uncertain system. 
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Do you agree with the following statement: “As an exporter of 
Norwegian seafood to the EU I would prefer a moderate tariff instead of 
a TRQ? 
I totally disagree 
I disagree 
I agree 
I totally agree 
I don`t know 
If yes, how high can this tariff be? 
32% of the companies totally disagreed with this statement, 
followed by 16% disagreeing. 21% agreed, while only 11% totally 
agreed. 21% had no opinion. The spread in the answers shows the 
diversity within this system. As we have seen indications of in both the 
utilization data and the other survey questions, the differences between 
the TRQs are large. For some seafood groups the TRQ moves tariff 
revenues from the EU to the Norwegian seafood exporters by giving 
them large TRQs allowing them to export to the EU at a zero-tariff the 
whole TRQ period. For others the TRQs represents barriers to trade in 
terms of binding quotas and high out-of-quota tariffs. For those 
companies agreeing with the statement, they wanted tariffs ranging 
from 0 to 5%. This probably means that for those exporting within a 
TRQ that is either small or has a high out-of-quota tariff or both, a tariff 
is preferable to a TRQ. A tariff will be stable and not represent the same 
risk for the exporters. For those exporting within a large TRQ that is not 
binding or within a TRQ with a very low out-of-quota tariff, a tariff will 
not represent a better situation. The result from this last question 
would most likely have been different if companies had been chosen 
based on what kind of seafood they exported. A survey with only 
pelagic seafood exporters would typically result in a higher percentage 
of agreeing answers. 
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5.4 Conclusions from part 5: Business survey 
 
Figure 16: Survey results; positive (yes) answers in per cent 
 
 
 
Even though the survey indicates that the problems and costs related to 
the adjustments utilizing the TRQs are minor and linked to specific 
seafood groups, we can see from figure X that there are issues creating 
barriers for the Norwegian exporters. The number of companies 
reporting of costs related to documentation of Norwegian origin was 
somewhat higher than anticipated, but the most alarming result to be 
extracted from this survey is the high number of firms reporting on the 
high level of uncertainty and risk related to these TRQs. 61% of the 
firms answered that the TRQs had raised uncertainty levels and made 
risk analyses harder. With small TRQs, a first come first serve policy 
and high out-of-quota tariffs makes planning ahead very difficult as the 
risk is high ending up paying the high out-of-tariff quota, producing 
negative results. The same percentage answered yes on the question of 
the TRQs being too small which indicates that the problem with risk is 
related to the fact that the TRQs are binding and being filled very fast. 
The two questions measuring the most severe consequences of the 
TRQs, asking if exporters have actually lost market shares and decided 
not to go into a EU market due to the TRQs did not have a large number 
of yes answers. But the fact any companies at all answered yes to this 
question is a sign that we are dealing with trade barriers so severe that 
we are losing shares in the EU market.  
 
 6. Coclusions  
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the impact of  the EU`s TRQs 
on Norwegian exporters. By analyzing utilization data and the result 
from the business survey the thesis attempt to say something about the 
existence of costs related to the utilization of the TRQs and if possible 
how large these are. As the survey response rate was around 10% with 
only 18 out of 183 companies responding, the result cannot be general-
ized, but it can still provide valuable information about the effect of 
TRQs. 
Through both the survey and the utilization data the thesis has 
managed to reveal that the transaction costs of utilizing the TRQs are 
varying across the different seafood groups. Processed pelagic fish and 
shrimp experiencing the most severe barriers with small TRQs and high 
out-of-quota tariffs. Overall the transaction costs turn out to be modest.  
This was also confirmed by the utilization data. Four companies 
reported minor costs related to the documentation of origin utilizing 
the compensation TRQs and two companies reported on different 
adjustments trying to reach the TRQ in time.    
On the other hand, the survey suggests that there are significant 
costs related to uncertainty and risk; with 61% reporting of uncertainty 
and risk being a problem related to the utilization of the TRQs is a high 
number and indicates that some of these TRQs are severe barriers even 
though the cost cannot be quantified. Two companies reporting of 
having lost market shares due to the inclusion of earlier free markets 
into the EU is also alarming and not in line with how the compensation 
TRQs were supposed to work; keeping the trade at the same level 
before and after the inclusion of new countries into the EU. 
Linking the survey and the utilization analysis we see that 42% of 
the compensation TRQs are binding and half of these are traded with a 
tariff almost all through the TRQ period. The survey confirms that the 
problematic seafood groups are shrimp, processed herring, crab, pro-
cessed cod, stock fish, clip fish and mackerel. Although the TRQs 
linked to these seafood groups are reported as too small and pro-
blematic, the transaction costs are not reported to as substantial. But 
what can be connected to both the reports of small TRQs and the filled 
and non-filled TRQs is uncertainty and risk. A large TRQ being filled 
quickly or a small TRQ with a high out-of-quota tariff, can both lead to 
uncertainty and force companies to abandon the market. The issue of 
trade and uncertainty is a very interesting topic and an important issue 
for further research. For an interesting contribution on trade under 
uncertainty and choice of export market, see Aarseth (2002). . 
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 8. Appendix 
8.1 Business Survey questions (In Norwegian)10 
1. Har din bedrift eksportert produkter til EU som er underlagt tollfrie 
kvoter de siste 3 år?  
2. Har din bedrift gjort tilpasninger, som for eksempel innfrysning, 
bruk av mellomledd, endret sesongmønster e.l. for å sikre seg en del 
av en tollfri kvote? 
a) Hvis ja, hvilke tilpasninger er gjort? 
b) Hva har disse tilpasningene kostet bedriften(prosentandel av 
salgspris)? 
3.  Er det betydelige kostnader knyttet til dokumentering og selve 
prosessen rundt den praktiske importen av deres produkter i EU 
(sammenlignet med en tollfri prosess)? 
a) Hvis ja, omtrent hvor store er disse kostnadene (svar i prosent 
av salgspris)? 
4.  Har de tollfrie kvotene ført til usikkerhet og gjort risikoberegninger 
vanskeligere for din bedrift? 
a) Hvis ja, på hvilken måte? 
b) Hvor store er de samlede utgiftene din bedrift har i forbindelse 
med utnyttelsen av de tollfrie kvotene (lagringskostnader, 
risikoberegninger osv) ? 
5.  De tollfrie kvotene tildeles per i dag etter et « første mann til mølla» 
prinsipp, vil det være ønskelig for din bedrift å endre denne 
ordningen (til for eksempel en ordning der kvotene auksjoneres 
bort)? 
a) Hvis ja, hvilken ordning vil din bedrift foretrekke? 
                                                             
10  The survey questions are given numbers for the purpuse of order in the appendix 
only. The informational questions are not included.  
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6.  Er det et problem at de tollfrie kvotene er for små og brukes opp for 
fort?     
a) Hvis ja, for hvilke kvoter (løpenummer) er dette et problem? 
7.  Eksporterer din bedrift til EU land også etter at den tollfrie kvoten er 
oppbrukt? 
a) Hvis ja, for hvilke produkter gjelder dette og hvor mye 
eksporterte din bedrift etter at kvoten var oppbrukt  i 2012?  
8.  Er du enig i følgende påstand? 
”Som eksportør av norsk sjømat til EU ønsker jeg heller en moderat 
toll istedenfor en tollfri kvote.”  
svært uenig 
uenig 
enig svært enig 
vet ikke 
a) Hvis enig, hvor høy kan denne tollen være? 
9. Har din bedrift mistet markedsandeler de siste 20 årene grunnet 
innlemmingen av flere land i EU og overgangen fra frihandel til 
kvoter? 
a) Hvis ja, kan du oppgi et omtrentlig overslag over tapt omsetning 
grunnet denne overgangen? 
10. Har din bedrift latt være å satse på markeder i EU grunnet 
kvotesystemet? 
11.  Har din bedrift innspill til hvilke krav norske myndigheter bør stille 
i forhandlingene om nye tollfrie kvoter? 
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